Newswise, February 19,
2016— Each fall, doctors stress the importance of getting a flu shot: influenza
is the most frequent cause of death from a vaccine-preventable disease in the
United States. But on-time delivery of the vaccine can be tenuous, and there
can be shortages during times of peak demand, as seen in 2014.
Research co-authored by
Fuqiang Zhang, professor of operations and manufacturing management at
Washington University in St. Louis’ Olin Business School, proposes a new
contract scheme for the vaccine supply chain that could reduce patient wait
time.
“In the past, we have
seen major flu vaccine shortages during the vaccination season, even though the
total supply for the flu vaccines was abundant,” Zhang said. “The major reason
for this is because of late delivery.”
The process begins
months in advance of influenza season. Starting in January, manufacturers make
educated guesses about what flu strains the federal government will target and
start production of a vaccine to match. They try to make a large quantity that
will be ready to sell to retailers by vaccination season, which usually runs
from late September to mid-November.
The U.S. Food and Drug
Administration makes its vaccine recommendation in February or March. If
manufacturers have guessed incorrectly on any of the strains, they must restart
that part of production.
Retailers, aware of the
manufacturers’ risk, anticipate potential delay in shipments and may commit to
smaller orders to avoid requesting a large supply that could arrive in late
fall, when public demand will be down, and then being left with unused doses.
The manufacturers, knowing that retailers will be cautious, are reluctant to
produce a large amount before the FDA’s final announcement.
The manufacturer-retail
gap is called a negative feedback loop. The result can be a shortage during the
period of peak demand, as happened in 2014.
“Two parties are making
their own decisions, but they are dependent on each other,” Zhang said. “When
you have a decentralized supply chain with independent parties and they are
self-interested, they may not want to make decisions that are optimal for the
entire supply chain. They will make decisions that maximize their own payoff or
profit.
“That’s a key issue
behind this flu vaccine shortage problem,” he said
.
Zhang teamed with
Tinglong Dai of Johns Hopkins University and Soo-Haeng Cho from Carnegie Mellon
University and examined the current supply chain process from start to finish.
In the research,
recently accepted by the journal Manufacturing & Service Operations
Management, Zhang and his partners propose a new solution called a Buyback and
Late Rebate (BLR) contract.
Both buybacks (returns
for time sensitive products) and rebates on late shipments have been used
separately in an attempt to alleviate the flu vaccine negative feedback loop,
with limited success. Zhang said the combined incentive approach will make a
big difference in fixing the supply chain gaps.
“If you use buyback and
late rebate separately, they don’t solve the whole problem,” Zhang said. “We found
that combining these two incentive contract terms, we optimize the supply
chain’s performance and maximize its efficiency.”
Zhang and his co-authors
believe that the combination of 100-percent buyback and rebates on late
shipments would motivate retailers to commit to larger orders, which in turn
would lead manufacturers to commit to greater and more prompt production. The
negative feedback loop would be broken, and a steady, reliable flow of vaccine
would be available, to the benefit of manufacturers, retailers, and patients.
“We looked at incentive
issues for the different parties, and then tried to provide a holistic solution
to the problem,” Zhang said.
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